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JURY TRIAL
CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS - APPLIED TO THE STATES
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
In the recent case of Bloom v. Illinois' the United States Supreme
Court again used the due process clause of the 14th amendment to
extend the sphere of influence of the Bill of Rights. Following its
pronouncement in Duncan v. Louisiana2 that the sixth amendment
guarantee of trial by jury3 applies to state prosecutions for "serious"
criminal offenses, the Bloom decision holds that the same right to
trial by jury applies in state prosecutions for criminal contempt of
court. However, left unresolved are two important questions: the
precise definition of serious crime and the extent to which the sixth
amendment's penumbral rights have been carried over to the states.4
In Bloom the petitioner attempted to introduce a false will into
probate after the death of the supposed testator. Finding that the
petitioner had tampered with this will, the Illinois trial court sus-
tained the prosecutor's charge of criminal contempt,5 while refusing
the accused's demand for a jury trial. Bloom was sentenced to 2
years in prison," and, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction.7  The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
due process of law' requires that criminal contemners sentenced to
1391 U.S. 194 (1968).
2 391 U.S. 145 (1968), decided the same day as Bloom.
3 The sixth amendment provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.... U.S.
CoNST. amend. VI. However, the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are not
directly applicable to the states. Only provisions of the Bill of Rights "fundamental
and essential to a fair trial" are made obligatory on the states by operation of the 14th
amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342 (1963).
4 "Penumbral rights" are not enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but are read into
the express guarantees to give them "life, meaning, and substance." See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965). For example, the penumbral rights of
the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury might include the right to an unani-
mous verdict and to a 12-man jury. See note 26 infra.
5 Criminal contempt can be differentiated from civil contempt by considering the
purposes of punishment for the particular act. Imprisonment for civil contempt is
remedial; one is imprisoned until he completes a mandatory act that benefits the
complainant. Criminal contempt is punished by a fixed term of imprisonment in
order to vindicate the court's authority; the punishment is punitive. Gompers v.
Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911). See also 17 C.J.S. Contempt
§ 15 (1963).
GIn Illinois no maximum punishment is provided for convictions of criminal
contempt. People v. Stollar, 31 Ill. 2d 154, 158-59, 201 N.E.2d 97, 99 (1964).
7 35 IMI. 2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 475 (1966).
8 See note 2 supra.
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2 years imprisonment must be accorded a jury trial in state courts.
The Court reasoned that criminal contempt is a serious offense if
punished by 2 years in prison, and that due process of law requires
a jury trial before an accused may be punished for a serious offense.
Recognizing that procedural fairness in contempt cases has a com-
peting consideration - criminal contempts are to be tried summarily
to vindicate the court's authority - the Court, nonetheless, con-
cluded that in light of the seriousness of the offense, the funda-
mental protection of a jury trial was paramount.9
By applying the guaranteed procedural protection of a jury trial
in Bloom, the Court has overturned the doctrine of summary trials
in criminal contempt proceedings, a doctrine which emanated from
the time of Blackstone's Commentaries.1° Gradually, three preced-
ing cases laid the foundation upon which the Bloom decision built a
new rule. United States v. Barnett" and Cheff v. Schnackenherg12
were criminal contempt cases in which defendants were sentenced
to 6 months imprisonment without being afforded a jury trial. Al-
9 391 U.S. at 208-10. The purpose of summary trials in criminal contempt cases
is to preserve order in the court and to have an available sanction to insure that
court orders are followed. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303, 309 (1888). See
also Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,
594-96 (1895); EJlenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36-38 (1890). Opposed
to the purposes of summary trial of criminal contemners is the protection provided by
a jury trial against arbitrary exercise of a judge's power. Since contempt will either
be a direct insult to the court or represent a rejection of the judicial institution, a
judge's temperament may be short in dealing with criminal contemners. The jury
will protect the accused from bearing the wrath of a judge's uncontrolled anger. 391
U.S. at 202.
10 Before Blackstone's treatise was written, contempts which occurred in the actual
presence of the court were tried with a jury. However, a strange series of events took
place in England in 1765 which caused a great change in the law. An Englishman
was convicted of contempt of court, and a technical error voided the case. King v.
Almon, 97 Eng. Rep. 97, 99-101 (K.B. 1765). Justice Wilmot's opinion was never
delivered. In 1802 after Wilmot's death, his son published his judicial notes which
included the undelivered opinion. Wilmot declared that the courts always had the
power to punish contempts summarily, even if they were not committed in the presence
of the court. However, subsequent research has indicated that Wilmot's declaration
was without legal support. Despite the precedent which differed with Wilmot's view,
Blackstone accepted the opinion of his friend, Wilmot. In Blackstone's Commen-
taries it is declared that criminal contempts are triable summarily. 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 286-87 (Dawson ed. 1966). Blackstone's treatise became highly
respected and is the basis of much of our law today. Goldfarb & Kurzman, Civil
Rights v. Civil Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 486, 488-89
(1965).
Notwithstanding the persuasive historical evidence pointing to Blackstone's error,
the Bloom Court was reluctant to rest its decision on historical analysis: "We do not
find the history of criminal contempt sufficiently simple or unambiguous to rest re-
jection of our prior decisions entirely on historical grounds .... " 391 U.S. at 200 n.2.
11376 U.S. 681 (1964).
12 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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though the Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, these cases
indicate that the defendants would have been entitled to a jury trial
if the punishments had been greater than 6 months. Given impetus
by a footnote in the Barnett case, which intimated that the right to
jury trial would be available to criminal contemners if they were to
be punished by more than 6 months imprisonment," the Cheff opin-
ion, invoking the Court's supervisory power over the federal
courts,'4 issued a directive stating that: "Sentences exceeding six
months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts
absent a jury trial or waiver thereof." 5  The final ingredient was
supplied in Duncan v. Louisiana," decided the same day as Bloom.
Although not concerned with criminal contempts, Duncan held that
an individual accused of a criminal offense who faced a maximum of
2 years imprisonment 7 was entitled to a jury trial in the state court.
Since Mr. Bloom was faced with 2 years imprisonment (an impri-
sonment that entitled the criminal contemner to a jury trial in fed-
eral courts and an imprisonment that makes the crime a serious of-
fense allowing the accused a jury trial in state courts) the Supreme
Court reversed the Illinois decision, stating that the accused had
been deprived of his freedom without due process.'8
Constant throughout Barnett, Cheff, and Duncan is the premise
that the length of punishment determines whether the right to jury
trial attaches.' 9 The Bloom decision makes it dear that the sixth
13 In view of the impending contempt hearing, effective administration of
justice requires that this dictum be added. Some members of the court are
of the view that without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment
by summary trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that
penalty provided for petty offenses. 376U.S. at 694-95 n.12.
A "petty offense" is defined as any crime not punishable by more than 6 months in
prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1958).
14 See generally McNabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The Supreme
Court's supervisory power over federal courts is inferred from Article i1, section 1,
of the Federal Constitution. This power of supervision does not extend to state courts.
15 384 U.S. at 380.
16 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17 Duncan was not actually imprisoned for two years, but he faced a maximum
imprisonment of 2 years according to statute. LA. CONsT. art. VII, § 41. Bloom
actually faced 2 years in prison and the Court said that in order to determine the
seriousness of the offense where the legislature has not expressed a judgement as to
the seriousness of the offense "we look to the penalty actually imposed." 391 U.S.
at 211. In Duncan the court considered the maximum imprisonment possible in deter-
mining the seriousness of the offense.
18 See note 2 supra.
19 At this point it should be noted that several federal statutory guarantees of jury
trial for criminal contempts are available in certain situations, none of which was
applicable to Bloom: 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1964) (jury trial in criminal contempt
proceedings where the act in question constitutes a separate criminal offense); 18
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amendment right to jury trial attaches when a criminal contemner
receives a serious sentence. Left unresolved, however, is the ques-
tion of what constitutes a serious offense. Defining this terminol-
ogy would have enhanced the value of the decision, since an ideal
opinion not only settles the issues which counsel brings before a
court in light of social policy considerations, but also must "provide
a guide to positive action in the future."2 Having left unresolved
the precise definition of serious crime, it is evident that the Court
has not reached the pinnacle of judicial craftsmanship in the Bloom
opinion.
Impliedly, the Court's reliance on Cheff sets the critical line at
6 months, a result which is in accord with the federal definition of
petty offense - any crime punishable by imprisonment for 6 months
or less. 2 ' However, the majority clearly points out that the Court
is not deciding the question of what is a serious crime.22 Since the
right to jury trial attaches only when the crime is serious, the Court's
failure to promulgate a precise definition will make it exceedingly
difficult for state courts to decide whether they must afford jury
trials in cases where the maximum jail sentence is less than 2 years.
The Court has also left unresolved the question of whether the
federal jury standards of a 12-man jury and a unanimous verdict are
guaranteed in a state court to one accused of a serious crime.23 In
U.S.C. §§ 3691, 3692 (1964) (jury trial in criminal contempts arising out of labor
disputes); Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 151, 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1964) (mandatory
jury trial de novo where sentence exceeds 45 days for criminal contempt arising under
the Act); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1101, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 h (1964) (in any
criminal contempt proceeding under the Act, the contempt must have been shown to
be intentional and the maximum sentence may not exceed 6 months).
2 0 Lewis, The High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 526,
554 (1968).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964).
22 "In Duncan we have said that we need not settle 'the exact location of the
line between petty offense and serious crimes' but that 'a crime punishable by two
years in prison is ... a serious crime and not a petty offense.' " 391 U.S. at 211. The
fact that the Court has not set the precise point at which the right to jury trial will at-
tach was reiterated in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). "Both Duncan and
Bloom left open the question whether a contempt punished by imprisonment one year
is, by virtue of that sentence, a sufficiently serious matter to require that a request for
jury trial be honored." Id. at 633.
23 Another problem which the Bloom decision failed to resolve concerns the ques-
tion of retroactive application. The Court answered this question a few weeks later in
DeStefano v. Woods, id., holding, per curiam, that both Bloom and Duncan are to be
applied prospectively from the date of decision: "W~e will not reverse state convic-
tions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date
of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisana and Bloom v. Illinois." Id. at 635. In
reaching this decision, the Court applied the test for prospective overruling enunciated
in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), whereby a decision reversing prior
doctrines in the area of criminal law will be applied prospectively from date of decision
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his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas pointed to this hiatus in
the majority opinion; 24 he reasoned that the majority's reliance on
Duncan v. Louisiana 5 incorporated sub silentio into the Bloom de-
cision a footnote in Duncan which declares that the ancillary or
penumbral rights of the sixth amendment (the right to a 12-man
jury and a unanimous verdict) are guaranteed in state courts, as well
as federal courts.2 6 In deference to principles of federalism, Justice
Fortas was unwilling to accept such a drastic curtailment of the
states' power to set jury standards. Although there is logic to the
Fortas argument, the reasoning is strained, and it seems highly un-
likely that the Court would effect such a major limitation on state
power by implication2 7
Since the majority failed to rule definitively on the question of
whether federal jury standards are to be applied to the states, the
states are bound only to a watered-down version of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee of trial by jury. Furthermore, since 12 states do not
presently require 12-man juries in all serious criminal cases, 8 the
when law enforcement authorities have justifiably relied on the old standards and where
retroactive application would seriously disrupt the administration of justice in the state
courts. For a discussion of the Stovall case and the problem of prospective overruling
in general, see Recent Decision, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 410 (1968).
24 194 U.S. at 211-14.
2 5 See note 16 supra.
26 194 U.S. at 158-59 n.30. In Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 348 (1898), the
Court interpreted the sixth amendment as guaranteeing a 12-man jury in serious
criminal cases, and in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), it was held that the
sixth amendment required a unanimous verdict. Left unresolved in Bloom is the
question of whether the due process standard of the sixth amendment makes these
ancillary rights obligatory on state trials.
27In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the Court noted that Duncan v.
Louisana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), had not decided whether the federal requirement of
a unanimous verdict was constitutionally obligatory for state trials: "Duncan left open
the question of the continued vitality of the statement in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581, 586, that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial includes a right not to be con-
victed except by a unanimous verdict." Id. at 633. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights
as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 935 (1965), where it is sug-
gested that since the penumbral rights are declared through the Court's supervisory
power, they are controlling only in federal courts. See also Recent Decision, 19 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 410, 419 n.53 (1968). However, if the penumbral rights are to give
"life, meaning, and substance" to the core right, the line should not be drawn between
federal and state courts. The penumbral right should be extended to anyone in any
court. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Parker v. Gladden, 385
U.S. 363 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28 Of the 12 states which do not provide 12-man juries in all serious crimes, five
states allow for a jury of less than 12 men in cases where the maximum penalty is one
year or less: ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 11, ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.15.150, 22.15.060,
11.75.030 (1962); IowA CONST. art. 1, §§ 9-10, IowA CODE §§ 602.39, 602.15,
687.7 (1966); Ky. CoNsT. §§ 7, 11, 248, Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 25.010, 26.010 (Supp.
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Court's failure to apply the federal standards to the states will per-
mit the judges in these states to continue to use state rules.
The decision in Bloom holds that the right to trial by jury at-
taches in state courts when criminal contempt rises to the level of a
serious offense. Whether a charge of criminal contempt is serious
depends upon the length of the sentence, and, as previously noted,
neither the Bloom nor the Duncan decision expressly defines the
point at which a jail sentence becomes serious. By implication, the
Court's reliance in both Duncan and Bloom on Cheff v. Schnacken-
berg2 9 sets the critical line at 6 months. Since a judge must grant or
deny a demand for jury trial before he has knowledge of the circum-
stances that ordinarily determine the appropriate sentence, he might
deny the demand for a jury trial and inflict 6-month imprisonments
summarily as a matter of course. However, in the Duncan case the
Court looked to the maximum sentence possible to determine
whether the crime charged was serious, and at the time the demand
for jury trial is made in a contempt case, the judge possesses the
power to sentence the accused to more than 6 months, unless his
power to impose sentences for contempt is circumscribed by statute. 0
Assuming that the critical line is 6 months and that the Duncan ap-
1966); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 19,20, OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 272, tit. 21, § 10 (1951);
VA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 8, 11, VA. CODE §§ 19.1-206, 18.1-9 (1960).
In one of the 12 states, Texas, a six-man jury is authorized in cases in which the
punishment is less than two years, but in misdemeanors nine men can render a ver-
dict TEX. CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 15, art.5, § 17, TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art.
4.07, 37.02(1966), TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1148 (1968). Of the remaining five
states, Florida and Utah require a 12-man jury in capital cases only: FLA. CONST.
Declaration of Rights §§ 3, 11, art. 5, § 22, FLA. STAT. §§ 913.10, 919.10 (1965);
UTAH CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 12, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-5 (1953). In Oregon,
except for a first degree murder case, 10 members can bring forth a verdict. ORE.
CONST. art. 1, § 11, ORE. REv. STAT. § 136.610 (1957). In South Carolina, six-man
juries are provided for except in the most serious crimes. S.C. CONST. art. 1, §§ 18,
25, art. 5, § 22, S.C. CODE §§ 15-612, 15-618 (1964). In New York State, outside of
New York City, if the possible sentence is less than 1 year, a six-man jury is provided,
but in New York City the maximum sentence must be greater than a year just to
receive a jury trial. N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, art. 6, § 18, PENAL LAW § 1937 (1944),
N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. §§ 702, 710 (1958), N.Y.C. CRIM. CT. AcT § 40 (1966), N.Y.C.
CRIM. CT. AcT. § 31 (1963). Louisiana, the 12th state, a civil law jurisdiction,
provides for a jury trial if the accused may be or must be sentenced to hard labor.
In the former situation, the accused is entitled to a five-man jury; in the latter situa-
tion, the accused is entitled to a 12-man jury, only 9 of whom must concur in a ver-
dict. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 41; LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 782. The preceding
statutory breakdown is collected in Brief for Appellant, at Appendix B, Duncan v. Louis-
iana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
In the 12 states which do not presently provide for 12-man juries and unanimous
verdicts, defense counsel should be advised to motion that these federal rights be
applied in order to preserve appellate review on the matter.
29384 U.S. 373 (1966).
3oSee note 32 infra.
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proach to defining a serious offense is applicable to contempt cases,
it follows that defendants accused of criminal contempt in state
courts are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial unless the judge's
power to impose a jail sentence is limited by statute to a maximum
of 6 months. Thus, the Bloom decision will have a major impact
upon the administration of criminal justice in the 17 states which
either have no limit on the sentence which a judge can impose for
criminal contempt or a limit in excess of 6 months.31
summarily as a matter of course. However, in the Duncan case the
Furthermore, the decision in Bloom will have the effect of limit-
ing the potential for the arbitrary exercise of judicial power inherent
in criminal contempt cases in states which have not limited the
judge's contempt powers by statute. 2 Viewed together, the Bloom
and Duncan decisions effect a considerable expansion of the right
to trial by jury in state courts whereby defendants charged with mis-
demeanors punishable by 1 year in jail may now be constitutionally
entitled to jury trials. Indeed, the impact of Bloom and Duncan has
already been felt in New York where, as a result of the recent stu-
dent riots at Columbia University, 900 students are charged with
various criminal offenses punishable by up to 1 year in prison.
3 1 Twelve states have no limit on the punishment that the judge may impose for
criminal contempt: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 36.22 (1961); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 252 (1964); MI. ANN. CODE art. 26 § 4 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 476.120
(1949); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2122-2123 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1-2 (1953),
36-16-2 (Supp. 1964); R-L GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-6-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
10-1738, 15-231 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §123 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §§
18.1-292-293 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-26 (1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. §1-
669 (1957). Five states have limits in excess of 6 months which can be imposed on
a criminal contemner: GA. CODE ANN. § 24-105 (1959); DEL. SUPER. CT. (CRUM.)
R. 42 (1953); KANSAS GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1204, 21-11 (1964); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:857 (1952); S.D. CODE §§ 13.1235, 13.0607 (1939), 33.3703 (Supp.
1960), cited in 1967 DUKE L.J. 654 n.64 (1967). If the critical line for serious
offense is 6 months, and if the Duncan approach to defining serious offense in terms
of the maximum sentence possible is applicable to contempt cases, the constitutionality
of these statutes has been brought into serious question by the Bloom decision.
3 2The necessary corollary of this limitation on the judge's power is an expansion
of the jury's power to control the court's ability to vindicate its authority and imple-
ment substantive law. By way of illustration, assume that a restaurant owner has been
charged with contempt for refusing to obey a court order enjoining him from racial
discrimination and for misconduct during the injunction proceedings. Assume also
that this occurs in a state that has not limited the judge's contempt powers by statute,
the potential sentence is greater than 6 months, and the defendant is entitled to trial
by jury on the charge of criminal contempt. Under such circumstances, a jury sym-
pathetic with the restaurant owner's racial views could find the defendant not guilty
and thereby frustrate the court's ability to preserve its dignity and enforce the law.
In view of this possibility, states which presently have no limits on a judge's contempt
powers should be advised to impose a 6-month limitation on the judge's power to
sentence for contempt in order to preserve the court's power to maintain courtroom
decorum and enforce its decrees.
1969]
